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We examine how group-specific differences in reservation wage, arising due to asymmetries 
in social entitlements, impact on distribution via the joint determination of class conflict 
between workers and employers, and ‘ethnic’ conflict among workers.  We model a two-
dimensional contest, where two unions, representing different sections of workers, jointly but 
non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in enforcing an exogenously given rent, 
while also contesting one another.  The rent arises from a ‘living’ wage, set above reservation 
wage rates via labour regulations.  We show that high reservation wage workers gain, and 
employers lose, from better social entitlements for low reservation wage workers.  The latter 
however benefit, with employers and against the former, from weak labour regulations.   
When minority/immigrant workers are marginalized both in the labour market and in non-
wage entitlements, improving job access and expanding ‘social support’ has contradictory 
effects on class and ethnic conflicts.  ‘Trade unionism’, i.e. political articulation of shared 
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•  I thank Ravi Kanbur for numerous conversations over the years on issues related to this paper. 1.  Introduction 
Conflict between workers across ethnic or religious divides is typically perceived as reducing their 
collective strength as a class in the common distributive conflict against employers.
1  The key 
strategic question frequently facing political formations on the Left is thus how class unity among 
workers may be achieved in practice.  At the same time, greater mobilization of workers in their 
common economic conflict against employers is also often considered an effective barricade against 
ethnic conflict within the working class.  The idea appears to be that the very provision of a political 
platform for articulating common economic interests of workers would serve to reduce conflicts 
within the working class along identity fault-lines, by revealing to them the ultimately self-defeating 
consequences of such ‘fratricidal’ warfare.
2  Yet, in practice, attacks on one section of workers by 
another are often sought to be legitimized by the argument that the former are objectively advancing 
the interests of employers against those of the working class as a whole.  Thus, for example, during 
the anti-immigrant riots in South Africa in May 2008, Black South Africans involved in the violence 
were reported as accusing foreigners of undoing years of fighting against white rule and undermining 
the minimum wage.
3  Differences in reservation wage rates between native and immigrant workers 
impacted on both class conflict between workers and employers and ethnic conflict among workers: 
these two dimensions of distributive conflict in turn conditioned one another. 
  Individuals often acquire a quantum of resources purely by virtue of their membership of 
some collectivity.  Identity divisions among workers, in conditions where they acquire political 
salience, also often largely overlap with historically generated differences in such ‘social’ (i.e., non-
market) entitlements.  Social entitlements in turn determine the terms under which an individual is 
willing to sell her labour power in the industrial economy, i.e. her reservation wage.  Workers from 
communities with lower social entitlements typically have a lower reservation wage.  The primary 
objective of working class organizations in the economic conflict against employers is to ensure a 
greater surplus for workers, i.e., a higher premium over the reservation wage.  Yet, the same wage rate 
                                                 
1  Lenin’s 1905 address to Jewish workers in Russia provides a clear, and oft-cited, articulation:  “(T)he 
Jewish workers, as a disenfranchised nationality, not only suffer general economic and political oppression, but 
they also suffer under the yoke which deprives them of the elementary civil rights.  The heavier this yoke, the 
greater the need for the closest possible unity among the proletarians of the different nationalities; for without 
such unity a victorious struggle against the general oppression is impossible” (Lenin, 1986: p. 42).    
2 For example, Barack Obama attempted to trump racial divisions with a call to working class unity 
during his 2008 US Presidential campaign: “(T)his time we want to talk about the fact that the real problem is 
not that someone who doesn't look like you might take your job; it's that the corporation you work for will ship 
it overseas for nothing more than a profit”  (Speech in Philadelphia; The Guardian, London, 18 March 2008).   
3 “Other locals expressed anger, arguing that Africans from neighbouring countries were prepared to 
work for only $4 a day when they insist on a minimum wage of at least $12.  They were also angry with white 
South Africans who employ foreigners for what they say is next to nothing.  Responding to the charge that black 
South Africans are lazy and unwilling to work as hard as their poorer neighbours and were chasing away the 
competition, the group asked why they should have to toil for so little or be poor in a country rich with 
diamonds and gold” (“S Africa violence reaches Cape Town”: Al Jazeera English, 23 May 2008, 
http://english.aljazeera.net/).  
  1implies differential premiums for workers across identity divides, when such divides overlap, due to 
historical reasons, with present differences in reservation wage.   
The purpose of this paper is therefore to examine how ethnicity or religion-specific 
differences in reservation wage, interpreted as the consequence of historically generated asymmetries 
in social entitlements, impact on distribution via the joint determination of class conflict between the 
working class and the employing class, and ‘ethnic’ conflict (i.e., distributive conflict along such 
identity divides) within the working class.  Does prior inequality in social entitlements within the 
working class end up harming even its privileged section?  Would higher returns from engaging in 
class conflict reduce ethnic conflict or benefit all workers?  Can ‘trade-union politics’, i.e. articulation 
of shared economic interests in contesting the employing class, suffice as an incentive for rational 
workers to abjure intra-class warfare?  These are the questions we address.
4 
The connection between identity divides and asymmetries in social entitlements (and thus 
reservation wage) among different segments of workers that we highlight arises in many different 
contexts.  Jewish workers in Europe in the 19
th and early 20
th centuries, Arab workers in Israel, Black 
workers in apartheid South Africa, Black workers in Jim Crow US, lower-caste workers in India, all 
provide obvious examples of segments systematically denied access to residential neighbourhoods 
and valuable public facilities, including security, that are available to other segments of the working 
class.
5  In many developing societies, customary rights to rural common property resources such as 
forests, rivers, ponds, grazing land, and sometimes even small plots for subsistence agriculture, are 
contingent on being born into specific ethnic or religious groups.  In most countries, large sections of 
immigrant workers face legal restrictions on accessing health, welfare and educational facilities, 
relative to the native-born.  Furthermore, ethnic and religious communities often develop their own 
support institutions which largely, or even entirely, exclude other communities.  Thus, workers from 
communities with weaker internal support institutions find themselves with lower social entitlements. 
  There is a second sense in which differences in community origin may generate differences in 
social entitlements.  Modern large-scale production develops by absorbing, as workers, individuals 
from traditional forms of employment in subsistence agriculture, artisanal production, petty trade and 
services.
6  Different ethnic or religious groups have often specialized in specific niche occupations in 
pre-modern societies.  Entry into these occupations was regulated by a mix of custom, traditional law 
and competitive advantage due to inter-generational transmission of information and training 
                                                 
4  Roemer et al. (2007) have shown how ethnic divisions may lead to electoral equilibria which restrain 
redistribution.  We focus instead on non-electoral conflict equilibria.  Thus, our contribution is rooted in the 
literature on conflict and rent-seeking contests (see Garfinkel and Skaperdas, 2007, for a survey).  In this 
literature, Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) and Glazer (2002) analyse aspects of internal vs. external rent seeking.  
While sharing a structural analogy, our specific focus is different.  Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007, 2005a) examine 
the mediation of ethnic and class conflicts through voluntary contribution to public goods that are valued 
independently of income consequences.  We complement their analysis by abstracting from such public goods.  
5  See Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005b) for an expanded discussion of how community origin may 
influence access to public goods.   
6  As in the classical two-sector model of economic development due to Lewis (1954).   
  2exclusively within the community.  Thus, in developing societies today, it is not unusual to find 
different traditional occupations generating different earnings, yet being largely dominated by 
particular identity groups.  The modern industrial economy expands in these societies by drawing in, 
as similarly paid workers, individuals whose earning opportunities in the residual, traditional/informal 
sector can vary greatly depending on their ethnic location.
7 
While conflict between workers and employers has various dimensions, we focus on such 
conflict over the scope and implementation of a given, legislatively sanctioned ‘social/living wage’.  
While the notion of ‘social entitlement’ involves the rights of individuals to a quantum of resources 
purely by virtue of their membership of some community, that of a ‘social’ wage involves a collective 
recognition of an individual’s right to a quantum of resources merely on account of her willingness to  
alienate her labour power.  Minimum wage laws constitute the obvious example of social regulation 
of the employment relationship.  But the notion of a social wage also includes regulation of other 
aspects such as workers’ health and safety, hours of work, leave and childcare facilities, minimum age 
of employment etc.  Together, such labour regulations aim to put a composite floor on an individual’s 
return from selling her labour power, above what an uncontrolled labour market might typically 
provide.  This composite floor, the social wage, thus generates a rent, which is contested over by 
workers and employers.  While unions seek to enforce and expand the scope of the social wage, 
employers attempt to restrict or evade it, whether illegally or by utilizing loopholes and ambiguities in 
legislation.  Much of the day-to-day conflict between employers and unions takes the form of such 
contestation.  It is this aspect of the class conflict, and its relation to ethnic conflicts among workers 
over sharing of the associated rent accruing to the working class as a whole, which we analyze. 
We model a two-dimensional contest, where two agents (unions), representing different 
sections of workers, jointly but non-cooperatively invest resources against employers in acquiring a 
share of an exogenously given rent, or surplus.  This surplus arises from an exogenously determined 
social wage, set above workers’ reservation wage rates.  Employers seek to evade the social wage and 
pay workers their reservation wage, whereas the unions attempt to defend (i.e. enforce) it.  The two 
sections of workers, interpreted as two different identity groups, differ in terms of their reservation 
wage.  The two unions also invest resources in a simultaneous contest against one another that 
determines how the surplus accruing to the working class is divided between its constituent sections.  
An agent representing employers chooses their resource expenditure on evading the social wage, 
taking into account the equilibrium defensive responses of the two unions.  Thus, ethnic conflict 
within the working class and class conflict between workers and employers jointly determine the 
distribution of the surplus among employers and the two constituent sections of the working class.   
                                                 
7  In India, for example, caste and religious groups typically continue to dominate in their respective 
traditional occupations, generating systematic differences in earnings across communities.  See, for example, 
Harris-White (2003).  Ethnic niches are not absent even in the modern sector, and capitalists may find it rational 
to wage discriminate among workers belonging to different ethnic groups (e.g. Roemer, 1979).  Our interest 
however lies in analyzing ethnic conflicts among workers even when they are treated identically by capitalists. 
  3We first show that the union representing ‘advanced’ workers, i.e., workers with high 
reservation wage, may concentrate exclusively on ethnic contestation against other workers, choosing 
to leave class contestation entirely to the union representing ‘backward’ workers, i.e. workers with 
low reservation wage.  The latter participates in both ethnic and class warfare.  We then show that a 
rise in the reservation wage of backward workers also benefits advanced workers, while hurting 
employers.  Such a rise reduces the incentive for the backward section to invest in either class or 
ethnic conflict, thereby increasing both employer evasion and the share of the advanced section.  For 
advanced workers, the second (ethnic) effect necessarily dominates the first (class) effect, so that this 
section benefits overall.  For employers, lower gain from successful evasion outweighs the benefits 
from greater evasion, so that their income falls overall.  A rise in the social wage, while aggravating 
both class and ethnic conflicts, benefits only the advanced section of the working class, making the 
backward section and employers both worse off.  These comparative static conclusions regarding 
conflict and distribution hold even when backward workers do not compete with advanced workers in 
large sectors of the labour market, say due to discrimination, legal restrictions, or small numbers.    
Our exploration suggests that advanced workers may, indirectly, benefit from improved social 
entitlements for backward workers.  Thus, we provide micro-foundations for an argument of class 
solidarity between  advanced and backward workers, grounded in an ‘enlightened’ (i.e. general 
equilibrium) conception of self interest.  However, our analysis also suggests that such an argument 
may be difficult to extend beyond the sphere of social entitlements to that of ‘labour rights’.   
Specifically, our results suggest that working class (say minority or immigrant) communities with 
weak entitlements may share an interest, with employers and against workers from privileged 
communities, in keeping labour regulations (and thus the social wage) relatively low.  Affirmative 
action programs that seek to open up larger sections of the labour market to workers from 
marginalized ethnic, racial or religious communities may pit such groups against workers from the 
dominant community, benefiting employers.  Thus, when ethnic minority or immigrant workers are 
initially marginalized both in the labour market and in access to non-wage entitlements, improving job 
access (say, through positive discriminatory job quotas) and expanding ‘social enfranchisement’ (say, 
through improved housing, health, child-support and unemployment benefits) for such workers may 
have contradictory effects on class and ethnic conflicts.  Lastly, our analysis suggests that the politics 
of ‘trade unionism’, i.e. articulation of shared objective economic interests alone, may prove 
insufficient to control ethnic conflicts within the working class.  A working class politics that also 
ventures into the provisioning of class-cultural public goods, i.e. of non-economic forms of shared 
identity articulation specific to the working class as a whole, may have better prospects.      
  Section 2 develops the model.  The main results regarding conflict and distribution are 
presented in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses their extension to contexts where backward workers are 
prevented from competing in parts of the labour market.  Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
  42.  The model 
Consider a society with two classes: employers (R) and workers (K).  R controls access to a 
productive asset, say land or capital.  This productive asset, when combined with one unit of labour, 
yields a revenue W .
8  K is endowed with two units of labour power, but R does not own any labour 
power.  Hence, R needs to employ half of K’s labour power to generate the (gross) revenue W ; it 
retains the surplus left after wage payments.  K is equally divided into ‘advanced’ (M) and ‘backward’ 
(B) sections, distinguished by different reservation wage rates, respectively,   and  ;  M w B w
0 ≥ > > B M w w W .  We interpret these two sections as different identity (ethnic or religious) 
groups.  Workers can be hired at some ‘social’ (exogenously mandated, and thus non-market clearing) 
wage rate  [ W w W M , ∈ ]
                                                
.  This social wage rate is however ‘contested’, in that employers attempt to 
attack (evade) it by hiring only B workers and paying them  , whereas workers seek to defend 
(enforce) the social wage.  The extent of implementation of the social wage is thus determined as the 
outcome of class conflict between workers and employers.  
B w
  To fix ideas, we think of the social wage as a legislatively mandated ‘minimum’ or ‘living’ 
wage, along with a package of mandated workers’ benefits or ‘protection’ (e.g. pensions, severance 
payments, workplace voice and control, health and safety regulations, leave and childcare facilities, 
limitations on hours, intensity and forms of work, seniority and overtime rules, minimum age of 
employment, etc.).  Typically, in practice, the social wage comes about as the legislative outcome of a 
complex and evolving process of society-wide political conflict and negotiation among 
representatives of workers, capitalists and others, including, historically, the landed gentry.
9  These 
conflicts and negotiations may also have trans-national dimensions, in that international agreements 
often impose social wage conditions on participating countries.
10  Once determined, the social wage 
generates a rent, which is contested over by workers and employers.  It is this subsequent contestation 
that we wish to conceptually isolate and analyze.  Such contestation can take both legal and extra-
legal forms.  Laws leave loopholes, grey areas and interpretative ambiguities that are fought over in 
courts by representatives of employers and unions.  Employers may also resort to illegal violation of 
labour regulations.
11  Contestation can involve litigation, lobbying, bribing of judges, regulators and 
politicians, strike making and strike breaking activities (including the strategic use of violence), etc. 
 
8  The assumption of inelastic labour demand can be relaxed without adding any substantive insight. 
9  Conservative foundations for the welfare state were laid down in the 19
th century by Disraeli in 
Britain and Bismarck in Germany.  Support or opposition from groups representing the peasantry, urban 
intellectuals, and the intermediate strata consisting mainly of petty traders, artisans and shopkeepers played a 
key role in the legislative evolution of labour regulations in most countries in the 20
th century.     
10  The European Union imposes a set of labour regulations on all member countries.  International 
trade, aid and investment agreements often include clauses regarding ‘fair’ labour standards/practices. 
11  For example, Indian firms with fewer than ten workers are not subject to labour regulations, while 
most large firms maintain a substantial casual labour force that is undeclared and thus free from regulation.  The 
government is currently proposing to restrict the scope of labour regulations further, to firms employing more 
than forty workers.  Violation of labour regulations is routine in developing countries.  See Dasgupta and Marjit 
  5  In the context of developing countries, one can site the social wage in the so-called formal (or 
modern, large-scale industrial) sector.  Unions are, by and large, confined to this sector; minimum 
wage laws and other labour regulations also usually pertain only to this sector.     
  Each section of K is represented by its own union.  The two unions, M and B, non-
cooperatively spend resources, respectively  , to defend the social wage.  Employers’ spending 
on attacks on the social wage is  .  We identify the extent of class conflict with overall expenditure 
on contestation over the social wage: 
B M h h ,
M h
R h
R B h h h + + ≡ .  If class conflict occurs ( ), the 
proportion of workers hired who receive W (working class success in the class conflict) is given by 







h h B M .  The proportion of workers hired who 









  There are different ways of interpreting our formulation of working class representation.  One 
can visualize this in terms of separate and openly competing organizations divided along ethnic, 
religious or linguistic lines.  One can also interpret it in terms of internally cohesive identity factions 
or even organizationally recognized sub-sections within a nominally united workers’ organization.
12  
The key idea that we seek to capture is that coordination costs of engaging in collective action are 
significantly lower within an identity group than across identity groups inside the working class.  
Class conflict involves attempts to ensure that all workers employed receive the social wage.  Such 
attempts leave open the issue of how the consequent high (social) wage jobs will be rationed.  This 
involves a second, ‘ethnic’ dimension to distributive conflict, which we now formally model.
 13 
Each union seeks to ensure a greater share of available high (social) wage jobs for its own 
section of the working class.  Expenditures on such ‘ethnic’ contestation are denoted by  ,  .   M g B g
We identify the extent of ethnic conflict with overall expenditure on contestation over the social wage 
                                                                                                                                                        
(2006) for a discussion and a model of class conflict in such a setting.  A recent British Trades Union Congress 
Report on Vulnerable Employment claims that more than two million people in Britain endure 19
th century 
workplace practices, including payments below the minimum wage, absence of paid holiday or sickness leave, 
exceptionally long hours, and no compensation for workplace injuries.  The report argues much exploitative 
treatment occurs because of legal loopholes that employers utilize (Trades Union Congress, 2008).  The Report 
itself provides an example of expenditure by trade unions to contest and restrict such loopholes.  Ehrenreich 
(2001) documents similar practices in the US, where union-busting constitutes a multi-billion dollar industry. 
12  In India, for example, central trade unions affiliated to the national political parties contain caste, 
religion or region-specific internal lobbies; a multitude of independent trade unions also exist which explicitly 
seek to represent workers from particular communities.  Ethnic sub-sections formed the organizational building 
blocks of the trade union movement in the Austro-Hungarian empire, as well as late 19
th - early 20
th century US.   
13  The de-linkage between contribution to class contestation and consequent gains typically arises due 
to indivisibilities in coverage and consequent non-excludability.  Class contestation thus acquires a public good 
aspect: unions cannot prevent free-riding.  For example, gains due to a strike cannot be restricted to participating 
workers, while enforcement of labour regulations cannot be confined to union members.  Consequently, unions 
separately seek to ensure that their members constitute a larger proportion of the workers under coverage: such 
attempts bring about inter-union conflict.  While the literature has widely noted the collective action problem in 
the context of individual unions, our intuitive entry-point is its exacerbation across ethnic/religious boundaries.   
  6within the working class:  B M g g g + ≡ .  Success in ethnic conflict is determined by relative 
expenditure: the share of social wage jobs that accrues to M is 
g
gM  if  , and  0 > g
2
1 14  otherwise.  
Intuitively, we think  within the working class, like class conflict, as having 
both leg
Let 
of ethnic conflict 
M M w W − ≡ Δ
al-legislative and extra-legal manifestations.  Ethnic conflict can involve the strategic use of 
violence against workers of a different identity group.  Violence, intimidation, strike action and 
organization of consumer boycotts can also be used against employers to induce them to offer a 
greater share of available high wage jobs to workers from a particular identity group.  Unions may 
lobby legislatures to pass or tighten laws restricting or enhancing access to high wage jobs for specific 
ethnic groups, through, say, ethnic hiring quotas, language requirements, immigration and residential 
restrictions, selective or preferential provision of job information, etc.  All these activities necessitate 
the expenditure of resources: thus, for our purposes, they are treated as a composite whole. 
− ≡ Δ B B w W , , 
M
B Δ
≡ Δ j π
Δ
; and let   denote the payoff (income) of 
agent  s follows.  {} R B M , , j j; ∈ .  These payoffs are then defined a
B B
B
B B w h g
g h
h
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B M g h ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ +
            
M M M
M M B

















Δ = π ;                                                     (2)                 










⎛ Δ = π .                                                                               (3) 
R first decides how much resource to allocate to attacking the social wage, i.e., the size of  .  The 
              
R h
two unions subsequently, and simultaneously, decide how much resource to allocate to class and 
ethnic conflicts.  Thus, the interaction between unions M and B is modelled as a Cournot game where 
the union  {} B M j , ∈  chooses its pair of conflict allocations  j j h g , , given the prior employing 
class confli n h .  This Cournot game is embedded a framework of Stackelberg 
interaction between the em loying class and the working class as a whole, with the former acting as 
the Stackelberg leader.  In standard fashion, we shall solve this game via backward induction.
ct allocatio R  within 
p
15 
                                                 
14  Skaperdas (1996) provides an axiomatic generalization of the Tullock contest function.  Our 




g risk neutrality, contest success can also be interpreted in probabilistic terms, instead of job shares. 
15  Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) model a general rent-seeking contest in two stages, where two internally 
homogeneous groups Cournot-contest a given rent in the first stage, and (identical) members of the winn
gage in mutual contestation in the subsequent stage.  Our formulation, in terms of a Stackelberg leader 
contesting a group with two dissimilar members, who simultaneously engage in contesting the leader as well as 
one another, is quite different.  Second, while Katz and Tokatlidu (1996) focus on how group size affects rent-
seeking expenditure, we examine how differences in reservation wage impact on conflict and distribution. 
  7  Consider therefore first the interaction between the two unions, facing a predetermined social 
wage rate (W) and employers’ conflict allocation ( ).  Recall the objective functions specified by 
(1)-(2).  For , the decision problem is: 
R h
{ B M j , ∈ }





















Δ = π . 
In equilibrium, it must be the case that: 
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.                                                                                           (7) 
 
Proposition 1.  In any Nash equilibrium,  , and  0 , , > B M B g g h 0 = M h . 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
By Proposition 1, in a Nash equilibrium, only backward workers will contribute resources to 
defending the social wage.  The advanced section will concentrate exclusively on ethnic contestation 
against other workers for a share of available high (social) wage jobs.  Thus, both sections of the 
working class will engage in ethnic contestation, but the advanced section will free-ride on the 
backward section in the sphere of class contestation.  This outcome is due essentially to fact that the 
net benefit (i.e., the rent) from employment at the social wage is lower for advanced workers, as their 
reservation wage is higher.  For advanced workers to contribute to the class conflict, they must 
therefore be ensured a higher share of available high wage jobs.  However, precisely because the net 
benefit from the social wage is higher for backward workers, the backward section will spend more on 
ethnic contestation, thereby ensuring a higher share for itself.  Their weakness in ethnic contestation, 
itself a consequence of their privileged position (in terms of a higher reservation wage), will make the 
advanced workers unwilling to engage in class contestation against employers.
16     
                                                 
n (a 
predomi
16  To offer a suggestive illustration, the labour upsurge in the US in the 1890s was halted partly by the 
rise of anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant sentiments, led by the American Protective Associatio
nantly Scotch-Irish group) and the United American Mechanics.  “Protestants were warned to avoid all 
unions dominated by papists, to discard the strike as a useless device, and to place no confidence in free silver.  
…  In the coalfields of Pennsylvania and Illinois this internecine strife checked a UMW organizing drive; in 
many cases it tore existing locals apart” (Higham, 1974: p.82).   





B .  Suppose an 




























































B B .                                                                                                   (10) 
Now, using (5), (8) and (10), and noting Proposition 1, we get: 
h
h
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= .                                                                                                              (11) 
Equation (11) represents the reaction function of the working class as a whole (K) faced by R.  R 
chooses its optimal conflict expenditure taking into account the response of K, as summarized by (11).  


















1 ( ) W W hR − + R B R
h h Max
R
π .                                                                (12) 
The first order condition yields the Nash equilibrium conflict expenditure of R: 
⎥ ⎦
⎤ ⎡ Δ + Δ
==
1 B h ⎢ ⎣ Δ 4
R
t
.                                                                                                              (13) 
Using (11) and (13), and recalling Proposition 1, we get the total equilibrium measure of class conflict 


















B .                                                                                                                 (15) 
Notice that, by (14), class conflict does not exhaust the surplus ( B Δ ).  Together, (8)-(10) and (13)-
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In light of Proposition 1, equations   
equilibrium if it exists.  Evidently, the Nash equilibrium must be unique if it exists.  
Notice that, from (14)-(15), we get the measure of equilibrium working class success in the 
class conflict, i.e. the proportion 
(13), (15), (17) and (18) together completely characterize a Nash






















ously, from (16)-(17), we get the measure of the success of the backward section of the 

















.                                                                                                        (20) 
By (20), the backward section is more successful in ethnic conflict than the advanced section.  As 
discussed earlier, this is due to its rent from the social wage being higher.  In turn, this outcome leads 
to the privileged section of workers withdrawing from the class conflict, as noted in Proposition 1. 
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 iff  .  Since B can always ensure   by 
choosing  , B 
 cannot constitute an equilibrium  exists in our m
e
A1 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.  A1 must hold when 
0 ] 2 1 [
2 > Δ − − Δ
.  Thus, 
B w
odel iff 
[] 0 = = B B g h
[] 0 =
0 ] 2 ≥ Δ .  We shall as
o so if  0 ] 2 1 [
2 < Δ − − Δ .  However, by Proposition 1, 
= B B g h
1 [
2 − − Δ
an equilibrium
quality holds strictly, i.e., we shall assume: 
A1.   0 ] 2 1 [ . 
2 > Δ − − Δ
Δ is 
 large, i.e., wh tion wage is sufficiently
backward seg
Note that, by (21) . 
 
sufficiently en the advanced reserva  higher than that of the 
ment.  Thus, A1 implies  2 > Δ , furthermore, A1 is necessarily satisfied when  5 . 2 ≥ Δ .  
-(23), and given A1, M, B and R are all strictly better off by contesting
  103.  Conflict and distribution 
)  A rise in the advanced reservation wage improves the success of the working class in the 
thnic conflict within the working class.  The backward section is more 
uces the success of the working class in the class 
onflict, while also reducing ethnic conflict within the working class.  The backward section is less 
t.  Class conflict falls.  
ir rent from social wage jobs, thereby 
duces the backward section to invest greater 
ocial wage.  Consequently, employers’ success in evading the social wage 
 reduced.  This in turn elicits greater conflict within the working class.  The direct effect 
We are now ready to specify how changes in reservation wage rates and the social wage impact on 
class and ethnic conflicts, and, thereby, distribution. 
 
Proposition 2.  Let A1 hold.  
(i
class conflict, while reducing e
successful in the ethnic conflict.  Class conflict is unchanged.   
(ii)  A rise in the backward reservation wage red
c
successful in the ethnic conflic
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 
A rise in the reservation wage of advanced workers reduces the
reducing their incentive to engage in appropriative activities against the backward section.  This 
directly reduces aggregate expenditure on ethnic conflict.  However, this relative withdrawal of the 
advanced section from ethnic contestation also in
resources in defending the s
is
nevertheless dominates, so that ethnic conflict falls overall (Proposition 2(i)).  Thus, greater inequality 
in non-market entitlements serves to strengthen the working class in its conflict with employers, while 
also increasing the share of backward workers in high (social) wage jobs and reducing distributive 
tensions among workers.  A rise in the reservation wage of backward workers reduces their net benefit 
from defending the social wage, inducing them to withdraw from both class and ethnic contestation.  
Such a rise also reduces the net benefit to employers from evading the social wage, leading to a fall in 
class conflict.  The overall impact nevertheless is greater employer evasion of the social wage.  The 
withdrawal of the backward section from ethnic conflict provides greater incentive to the advanced 
section to engage in ethnic contestation, but the former’s withdrawal from the class conflict reduces 
such incentive.  The net effect is both a fall in ethnic conflict and a relative strengthening of the 
advanced section.  Thus, Proposition 2(ii) implies that an improvement in social entitlements for 
backward workers leads to greater evasion of the social wage and lower representation of backward 
workers in high wage jobs, though it mitigates both class conflict and ethnic conflict.    
 
Remark 1.  Total conflict expenditure ( ) g h +  can be viewed as a measure of aggregate conflict.  By 
Proposition 2, a rise in the reservation wage of either section of workers reduces aggregate conflict. 
 
  11  Proposition 2 characterizes how changes in reservation wages simultaneously impact on class 
and ethnic conflicts.  We now proceed to specify their distributive consequences. 
 
Proposition 3.  Let A1 hold.  Then, a rise in the reservation wage of either section of the working 
class makes the other section better off, and the employing class worse off. 
Proof:  See the Appendix. 
 to withdraw from 
thnic contestation, thereby incentivising the backward section to invest more in the class conflict.  
 reservation wage of the 
t to withdraw from both class and ethnic contestation (Proposition 2(ii)).  
he first (class) effect impacts the advanced section adversely; the second (ethnic) effect impacts it 
cial 
ntitlem
er evasion by employers.  Thus, Proposition 4 implies a rise in the 
social wage generates an offensive by both employers and advanced workers against backward 
 
By Proposition 2(i), higher reservation wage for advanced workers induces them
e
Proposition 3 implies this offensive ensures greater surplus for the backward section, correspondingly 
reducing the income of the employing class.  Conversely, a rise in the
backward section induces i
T
positively.  Proposition 3 implies the ethnic effect dominates.  Despite greater evasion, employers are 
worse off, since the rise in the backward reservation wage also reduces their gain from evasion.   
  By Proposition 3, an improvement in social entitlements for any section of workers, mediated 
through general equilibrium channels of class and ethnic contestation, also ends up benefiting the 
other section (while hurting employers).  This suggests it may be in the objective economic interest of 
one section of the working class to support greater social entitlements for another.  Notions of class 
solidarity may in this specific sense be objectively grounded in an ‘enlightened’ (i.e. general 
equilibrium) understanding of self interest, and advanced workers’ opposition to greater so
e ents (say, in housing, education and health) for backward (say minority or immigrant) 
workers may perhaps be ascribed to ‘false consciousness’, ‘racial prejudice’ or employer propaganda.   
  However, the commonality of interest among workers in the sphere of social entitlement does 
not extend to the sphere of the social wage, as we now show. 
 
Proposition 4.  Let A1 hold.  Then, a rise in the social wage reduces the success of the working class 
in the class conflict, while increasing both ethnic and class conflict.  The backward section is less 
successful in the ethnic conflict.  Advanced workers are better off, while both employers and 
backward workers are worse off.   
Proof: See the Appendix. 
 
A rise in the social wage, by increasing the prize, intensifies both class and ethnic conflict.  Such a 
rise induces the advanced section to commit greater resources against the backward section, thereby 
reducing the latter’s share of high wage jobs.  This loss, in turn, weakens working class defence of the 
social wage, thereby inducing great
  12workers.  For the backward section, the negative impact of greater employer evasion and lower share 
utweighs the positive impact of the rise.
17  Employers benefit from greater evasion, but achieve a 
s
ent e working 
hiring 
uotas for particular sections of workers, as in the case of caste-based reservations in India.  One 
merically to meet the entire labour demand at 
o
lower surplus in case of successful working class defence. By Proposition 4, the second effect 
dominates.  For advanced workers, greater success in ethnic contestation outweighs greater evasion by 
employers.  Thus, advanced workers are the only beneficiaries of a higher social wage.  Evidently, by 
Proposition 4, the optimal social wage from the backward workers’ perspective is  M w .       
  In sum, Propositions 2, 3 and 4 together suggest that, while backward workers may share an 
interest with advanced workers against employers in improving their social entitlements, they may 
also share an interest with employers again t advanced workers in keeping the social wage low. 
 
4.  Extension: partially contestable labour markets 
In our analysis so far, we have assumed that the entire social wage employment is open to 
contestation by both sections of workers.  In practice, it may be that different segm s of th
class can directly compete with one another only in parts of the high wage labour market.  For 
example, immigrant workers are often legally barred from applying for particular types of jobs, or 
kept beyond the pale of labour regulations.  Affirmative action programs often take the form of 
q
section of the working class may also be too small nu
the social wage.  Residential segregation, social discrimination or legal restrictions on travel and 
relocation may confine workers of a particular ethnicity to geographic pockets, so that they are unable 
to take up jobs too far outside those pockets.  One can capture these situations in terms of some 
proportion, say  ( ] 1 , 0 ∈ q , of available (i.e. enforced) social wage jobs being contested over by the two 
groups of workers, with the remaining proportion ( ) q − 1  occupied exclusively by one group. 
  The conclusions presented earlier do not change if the backward section of workers can 
access a relatively high proportion of available social wage jobs (i.e., if either q  is close to 1 or the 
proportion  () q − 1  is reserved for backward workers).  However, if a sufficiently large proportion 
() q − 1  is reserved for advanced workers, so that the share of the labour market open to 
competition/contestation by backward workers, q, is sufficiently small, backward workers would 
withdraw completely from class contestation.  Th  noted in Proposition 1 now get reve e roles rsed, in 
                                                
that working class defence of the social wage is now carried out exclusively by advanced workers, 
 
17  Glazer (2002) shows that the owner of a firm may be better off hiring a less productive worker, if 
she also happens to be less efficient in stealing from the owner.  Our result, that backward workers are better off 
with a lower social wage, since this reduces ‘stealing’ by the advanced section, has a similar flavour.  
  13while b
e backward section 
           
oth sections of workers continue to take part in ethnic contestation.
18  This is a consequence of 
the fact that, as q  diminishes, the backward section’s marginal benefit from class contestation falls, 
while that of the advanced section rises.  A rise in the reservation wage of the backward section now 
comes to strengthen working class defence of the social wage, instead of weakening it (recall 
Proposition 2).  Conversely, a rise in the reservation wage of the advanced section weakens working 
class defence of the social wage, instead of strengthening it.  Thus, greater equality within the 
working class, in the sense of greater social entitlements for its backward section, serves to improve 
its success in the common conflict against employers only when the backward section is highly 
marginalized in terms of access to social wage jobs.  As earlier (Proposition 3), a rise in the backward 
reservation wage benefits the advanced section, while hurting the employing class.  Interestingly, 
however, a rise in the advanced reservation wage now comes to also benefit employers, by permitting 
greater evasion of the social wage.  A rise in the social wage continues to increase the share of 
advanced workers in high wage jobs, as well as both class and ethnic conflict (as in Proposition 4).  
However, such a rise now comes to reduce employer evasion of the social wage.  Employers thus 
doubly lose, while advanced workers doubly gain.  Backward workers lose if the negative ethnic 
effect (lower share) outweighs the positive class effect (stronger enforcement).    
Notice that improving access to employment on part of the backward section (formally, a 
marginal rise in q from some initial value close to 0) leads to an aggravation of ethnic conflict, a 
relative withdrawal of the advanced section from the class conflict, and a consequent increase in 
employer evasion.
19  As noted earlier, once q  crosses a critical threshold, th
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evasion, R is alway  better off by hiring a backward worker, R’s objective function remains unchanged.  
e.  At the beginning of WWII, Blacks had been ex
defence jo n Movement’ in 1941 by Black unionists, Roosevel
executive orde st job discrimination.  Subsequently, Black workers obtained footholds in aircraft, vehicle 
hi uilding.  Between March and June 1943, over 100,000 man-day
ains upgrading of Black workers.  One of the largest occurred a







19 US labour history serves to illustrat cluded from 
bs.  After the ‘March on Washingto t signed an 
assembly and s s were lost in ‘hate-strikes’ 
by whites ag t the Packard Works in Detroit 
being promoted.  Two months later, Detroit erupted into anti-Black pogroms that took thirty-fou
, 1977: pp. 221-223).  In 1945, United Auto Workers leader Richard Frankensteen’s predicted victory 
in his bid for the mayoralty of Detroit was denied by the defection of white auto workers protesting the CIO’s 
endorsement of the federal Fair Employment Practices Committee.  The next year, ‘Operation Dixie’ – the 
CIO’s ambitious Southern organizing campaign, collapsed in the midst of racial conflict within the movement.  
After the 1955 reunification of the AFL and the CIO, the trade union leadership, in general, continued to exhibit 
“… benign neglect, if not overt racism, towards the plight of Black and Hispanic workers.  …  (A)t the height of 
the anti-war and Black-power movements in 1968-70, the old-line craft unions, along with their allies in the 
Mafia-controlled teamsters and maritime unions, wrecked any hope of a New Deal-type social alliance by … 
opposing schemes for Black control of local institutions (like the police or schools), rejecting demands for 
affirmative action in apprenticeship programs, and, in a majority of cases, aligning with the urban-Democratic 
anciens regimes against ghetto and campus demands, even frequently against newly unionized public-sector 
  14comes to replace the advanced section in the common conflict against employers.  Then, further 
improvements in labour market access for the backward section (i.e. further rises in  ) strengthen 
defence of the social wage, whereas improvements in their social entitlements weaken such defence. 
q
     
5.  Discussion and concluding remarks 
Individuals typically acquire rights to a quantum of resources merely by virtue of their membership of 
some collectivity.  These social entitlements determine the minimal terms under which individuals are 
willing to sell their labour power, i.e., reservation wage rates.  Other rights pertain to the minimal 
terms under which employers may buy labour power.  These ‘labour rights’, in the form of floor 
regulations on employers regarding wage, pensions, severance payments, workplace health and safety, 
leave and childcare facilities, limitations on hours and intensity of work, overtime rules, etc., aim to 
guarantee a composite ‘social/living’ wage - a minimal return from selling one’s labour power that is 
usually above what an unregulated market might provide.  Social wage thus typically generates a rent, 
which is contested over by employers and workers.  Much of the quotidian conflict between trade 
unions and employers’ organizations can be viewed as the acting out of this contestation.      
  In heterogeneous societies, one’s social entitlements, and thus one’s reservation wage, often 
relate systematically to one’s ethnic or religious community origins.  It follows that organizations 
representing different communities of workers may differ in terms of their incentive to commit 
resources to enforcing the social wage.  Additionally, such organizations have an incentive to ensure a 
greater share of available social wage employment for their own respective client communities.  The 
conclusions generated by our formal analysis help to understand the general equilibrium 
interconnections between class conflict over enforcement of the social wage and ethnic conflict 
among different sections of workers over the sharing of available social wage employment. 
Our analysis suggests that advanced workers may, indirectly, stand to benefit from greater 
social entitlements for backward workers.  Thus, we provide some micro-foundations for an argument 
of class solidarity between  advanced and backward workers, grounded in an ‘enlightened’ (i.e. 
general equilibrium) conception of self interest.  However, our analysis also suggests that such an 
argument may be difficult to extend beyond the sphere of social entitlements to that of ‘labour rights’.  
Specifically, our investigation suggests that working class (say minority or immigrant) communities 
with weak social entitlements may share an interest, with employers and against workers from 
communities with stronger social entitlements, in keeping labour regulations (and thus the social 
wage) relatively low.  Additionally, affirmative action programs that seek to open up larger sections 
of the labour market to workers from marginalized ethnic, racial or religious communities may pit 
such groups against workers from the dominant community, benefiting employers in the process. 
                                                                                                                                                        
workers” (Davis, 1986: pp. 210-211).  The AFL-CIO opposed racial quotas in hiring as a matter of principle.  
Union membership declined from 26 to around 16% of the private-sector workforce during the 1970s. 
  15  Our results also suggest that trade union politics, i.e., an articulation of common economic 
interests of workers against employers alone, may prove insufficient to unify workers across ethnic or 
religious identity divides.  Dasgupta and Kanbur (2007), quoting historical examples, have argued 
that, instead, the provision and sharing of cultural public goods common to workers qua workers may 
nt 
                                                
hold the key to such unification.  The present analysis further highlights this idea.
20  At the same time, 
as Dasgupta and Kanbur (2005a) have formally shown, successful unification through contribution to 
common cultural public goods, which are valued independently of their income consequences, is 
predicated on a relative equalization of earnings across different working class identity factions.   
Relative equalization of access to high (social) wage employment would appear to be indispensable 
for such equalization of earnings.  Yet, as our analysis shows, expanding employment access for an 
initially marginalized minority group may lead to greater ethnic conflict within the working class and 
consequent reduction in the overall enforcement of social wage employment.  Expanding social 
entitlements, especially in terms of subsidized housing, health, education and cash transfers, for the 
marginalized group is likely to reduce ethnic conflict in the labour market and thereby improve 
enforcement of the social wage.  However, in the absence of a prior working class identity shared 
across community divides, such expansions may be resisted in the electoral arena by the advanced 
majority of working class voters.  Arguably, these dilemmas, brought into focus by our analysis, lie at 
the heart of the resurgence of racist and xenophobic politics in many Western countries today.
21       
  In many developing countries, weak social entitlements appear to play a stronger role than 
direct market discrimination in the economic fortunes of workers from disadvantaged communities.  
Additionally, disadvantaged communities often constitute a plurality of the working class.  In these 
countries, workers from disadvantaged communities often form the main support base for milita
trade union movements.  Our analysis suggests that the contradictions might be different in these 
societies.  Greater social entitlements, say, through subsidized education, social housing, medical 
facilities, petty credit and homestead land might serve to ‘demobilize’ backward section dominated 
unions, increasing both employer evasion of the social wage and advanced section representation in 
 
20 One of the most successful early unions in the US, the Knights of Labor, provides an example.  “A 
typical inventory of Knights-related organizations (in this case, Detroit 1885) encompassed: ‘Unions, Knights of 
Labor assemblies, Working-men’s Club Rooms, cooperative stores and factories, labor newspapers, singing 
societies, social clubs, political organizations, and a workers’ militia(i)’.  But the invention that most clearly 
testified to the Knights’ project of forging a parallel proletarian civil society was the Knights of Labor ‘Court’.  
… The embryonic class culture represented by the Knights not only transcended a ‘pure and simple’ trade-union 
economism, but also provided the first alternative to dominant ethno-religious sub-cultures” (Davies, 1986: 
p.31). The Knights achieved a large measure of unity among Irish, German and native-born workers, as well as 
making a pioneering attempt to integrate Black workers.  Theirs was the exception in the US.  “Whereas the 
Western European class struggles of the 1880s and 1890s had spun a web of integrating proletarian institutions 
(ranging from workmen’s clubs, cooperatives, and ‘labor churches’ to casas del pueblo and workers’ 
educational societies), the US labor movement of the late nineteenth century … failed to generate a working-
class ‘culture’ that could overcome ethno-religious alignments outside the workplace” (Davis, 1986: p. 41).   
21  Roemer et al. (2007) discuss the electoral consequences, of advanced workers’ opposition to greater 
social entitlements for backward workers, in the US, UK, France and Denmark.  See also Lee and Roemer 
(2005) and Alesina et al. (2001) for contributions on this theme. 
  16social wage jobs.  Such demobilization in turn may lead to the political leadership of workers 
belonging to backward communities shifting to ‘bourgeois’ elements within these communities.
 22 
Our analysis provides a general equilibrium contest-theoretic framework around which one 
can organize empirical studies of non-electoral forms of class and ethnic conflict in labour markets 
when community origins have a significant bearing on one’s reservation wage.  We look forward to 
such studies in the future.  In particular, we wish to highlight one possible empirical application. 
In 2005, the Indian Parliament passed the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA).  The NREGA offers up to 100 days of employment annually per rural household on public 
works, at some local, officially determined, minimum unskilled wage rate.  It is one of the largest 
rights-based social protection initiatives in the world, costing about US$2.5bn in 2006-2007.  This 
initiative has, quite expectedly, given rise to local contestation over distribution of the rent it has 
generated.  Activists seek to organize rural workers around the demand for employment at the official 
wage, while bureaucrats, politicians and contractors are routinely accused of underpayment.   
Simultaneously, organizations representing different caste, ethnic and religious groups in the village 
attempt to increase the share of their own community in available employment at the official wage.  
Conflicts along these two, conceptually distinct, dimensions interact and condition one another.  As 
information regarding the initiative gradually spreads in the rural areas, such conflicts can only be 
expected to intensify over time.  Our framework can be usefully deployed in structuring empirical 
investigations of the emerging pattern of social conflicts around the NREGA. 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1.  Suppose  0 , > M B h h .  Then (5) and (7) imply [ ] M M B B g g Δ = Δ .  Now, in 
a Nash equilibrium, if [for some  {} 0 , , > ∈ h B M k ], then [ 0 , > g g ], s k
.  Since 
M B
M
o that (4) and (6) hold 
ty, implying  M Bg Δ [] B M g Δ = B Δ > Δ , this contradicts  B Bg = Δ [] M M g Δ with equali .  
Hence, for some  {} , , = ∈ k h B M k tly,  0 0.  Eviden = = M B h h  cannot hold in equilibrium.  Hence, 
for some   {} 0 , , > ∈ k h B M k .  S 0 uppose  , 0 = > B h M h
[] M M g Δ =
.   T in equilibrium (4) and (6) 
must hold with equality B , so th B g
hen, since 
,  Bg Δ at  M g < .  Since  B M Δ > Δ , this yields   
[] M M B B g g Δ > Δ 7) holds with  nd (5) imply  .  However, since ( equality, (7) a [ ] M M B B g g Δ ≤ Δ .   ◊  
 
                                                 
22 In India, over the last two decades, the implementation of social entitlement programs for the so-
called Backward and Scheduled castes has overlapped with a weakening of traditional Communist influence in 
these communities, and the corresponding strengthening of caste-based groups led by their respective elites.  
The Communist Party of India (Marxist), India’s largest Left formation, has expressed alarm.  “(C)asteist forces 
can not only rally their supporters but also can influence a section of our supporters. …  The ordinary and poor 
sections of people engaged in traditional industries and agricultural sector have been with the Party because of 
struggles of many decades.  There are attempts to draw away the basic classes who are the foundation of the 
Party by using casteism.  Youth, women and other mass organisations are being strengthened on caste-basis.  It 
is also attempted to extend this tendency to the trade union and agricultural sectors” (CPI(M), 2003). 
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Recall (16), (19) and (20).  Part (i) follows from (14), (N1)-(N3) and (N5).  Part (ii) is implied by 
4) and (N6).                                                                                  ◊   (14), (N1), (N3), (N                            
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From (22), (N4) and (N9),  
0
4
1 Δ ∂ ∂ R π
t
4 ∂ Δ ∂ ⎦ ⎣ Δ ∂ B B w w
1







.                                                                        (N11)     






































.  In light of 
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 Together, (N13)-(N15) yield part yield our claims regarding distribution.                                          ◊  
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